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Abstract
The history of Cuba is one of conquest and rebellion. Since the arrival of Columbus, it has 
had two colonial masters: Spain and the United States. Spain, aft er the collapse of its empire, 
ceased to be a threat to the peoples of America. Now, the Spanish are among the principal 
investors in Cuba, and make up a high percentage of tourists to the island. The United States, 
engaged in empire-building as sole superpower and continuing to pursue a half-century-old 
policy of regime change in Cuba, is still seen by the Cubans as the greatest threat to their 
independence and sovereignty. This article reviews the history of relations between the two 
countries, seeking to contextualize their social origins and political evolution, concluding that 
an improvement in relations is unlikely absent a profound change in the political economy of 
either country, or of both, a change that could occur internally or be caused by external 
 factors.
“Si así es el cielo, preferimos el infi erno”: contextualizando las relaciones EUA–Cuba
La historia de Cuba es una de conquista y rebelión. Desde la llegada de Colón Cuba ha tenido 
dos dueños coloniales: España y Estados Unidos. España, después del colapso de su imperio, 
dejó de ser amenaza para los países de América. Ahora los españoles fi guran entre los princi-
pales inversionistas en Cuba, y representan un alto porcentaje de los turistas a la isla. Estados 
Unidos, empeñado en construir un imperio como única superpotencia, es visto todavía por los 
cubanos como la mayor amenaza a su independencia y soberanía. Este artículo repasa la histo-
ria de las relaciones entre los dos países, buscando contextualizar sus orígenes sociales y evolu-
ción política, concluyendo que una mejora en las relaciones no es probable sin mediar un 
cambio profundo en la economía política de uno u otro país o de ambos, cambio que podría 
darse por causales internos o externos. 
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“Si nous sommes en paradis, nous irions plutôt à l’enfer”: mettant dans un cadre des 
Relations d’Etats-Unis–Cuba
L’histoire du Cuba est une de la conquête et de la rébellion. Depuis l’arrivée de Columbus, elle 
a deux maîtres coloniaux: L’Espagne et les Etats-Unis. L’Espagne, après que la chute de son 
empire, cessé d’être une menace aux peuples de l’Amérique. Dès maintenant, les Espagnols 
sont parmi les principaux investisseurs au Cuba, et font grande partie des touristes à l’île. Les 
Etats-Unis s’occupent dans le bâtiment d’empire en tant que seule superpuissance et continu-
ent à poursuivre une politique des années cinquantes de changement de régime du Cuba et 
donc, est encore vue par les Cubains comme la plus grande menace pour leur indépendance et 
leur souveraineté. Cet article passe en revue l’histoire des relations entre les deux pays, cher-
chant à mettre dans un contexte leurs origines sociales et évolution politique. Il fi nit en disant 
qu’une amélioration des relations est peu probable sans un changement profond de l’économie 
politique du pays, ou de celle des deux, un changement qui pourrait se produire intérieure-
ment ou être provoqué par des facteurs externes.
Keywords
Cuba, Spanish colonialism, US imperialism, US–Cuba relations, Platt Amendment, Fidel 
Castro, José Martí, Hatuey
Introduction
Every student in Cuba learns early in life about Hatuey, the Taíno chieft ain. 
Witness to the horrors infl icted by the Spanish upon the indigenous people 
in nearby Hispaniola, and wanted by the Spanish, he escaped to Cuba to 
warn and organize the Taínos who had settled there. The Spanish did cap-
ture him, in 1512, and prepared to burn him at the stake. Before Hatuey was 
burned, a priest explained to him about heaven and hell, and that if he con-
verted to the god of the Spanish he would go to heaven. Hatuey asked the 
priest, pointing to the conquistadores around him, whether they, too, were 
going to heaven. Assured that they would be there, Hatuey told the priest 
that he would rather go to hell. This story – a scary and heart-rending tale for 
a schoolchild – has been seared into the synapses of every Cuban student 
since long before the Revolution of 1959 as the original legend of Cuban 
identity and nationhood. The bar of patriotism in Cuba is set high early 
in life.
About 250 years aft er Hatuey’s death, and to the north, another nation 
was being born. One of its founders inspired the colonists struggling against 
a foreign despot with the slogan that would defi ne their identity: Give Me 
Liberty or Give Me Death! Students in the United States learn, also early in 
life, this battle cry. One might think that the heirs of Hatuey and Patrick 
Henry, eventually separated by only a few dozen miles of sea, would be best 
friends in understanding and solidarity. That has not been the case.
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The history of Cuba is one of conquest and rebellion. Since the arrival of 
Columbus, it has had two colonial masters: Spain and the US. Spain, aft er 
the collapse of its empire, ceased to be a threat to the peoples of America. 
Now, the Spanish are among the principal investors in Cuba, and make up 
a high percentage of tourists to the island. The US, engaged in empire-
 building as sole superpower, is still seen by the Cubans as the greatest threat 
to their independence and sovereignty. This article reviews the history of 
relations between the two countries, seeking to contextualize their social ori-
gins and political evolution, concluding that an improvement in relations is 
unlikely absent a profound change in the political economy of either coun-
try, or of both, a change that could occur internally or be caused by external 
 factors.
US Expansion West and South
The nascent US set ambitious sights on expanding into the vast lands upon 
which it bordered.1 To the west, it would purchase the Louisiana territory in 
1803, and, to the south, Florida in 1819. Further to the west, it would take 
half of Mexico by war in 1848 and force the Gadsden Purchase in 1853. Near 
the end of the 19th century, the border with Mexico was fi xed, and the new 
country had moved on to purchase Alaska and to take Hawaii under the ban-
ner of Manifest Destiny. The southernmost maritime border, the tip of 
 Florida, pointed to new lands that cried out to be taken, aft er decades of 
waiting. Spain had lost most of its vast American empire by 1826. Toward 
the end of the 19th century it held only two small possessions: Cuba and 
Puerto Rico. The rise of the US, parallel to the fall of Spain’s empire, left  for 
the peoples of the islands only two likely outcomes: independence or annex-
ation to the US.
Cuba was well known to the leaders of the US. When the Revolutionary 
Army under George Washington was at its lowest point and needed money, 
Jean Baptiste Rochambeau sought funding from Admiral Francois Joseph 
Paul de Grasse, who at the time led a French fl eet in the Caribbean. He, in 
turn, asked for help from the Ladies of Havana, as they have come to be 
known, society ladies of patriotic sentiment who worked with local mer-
chants to raise the money. The merchants wanted to break with Spanish 
mercantilism in order to trade with the nearby colonies, and both they and 
1) The current population of Havana alone, 2.2 million, is roughly equivalent to the entire 
 European and African population, 2.5 million, of the Thirteen Colonies around 1775.
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the Havana ladies, like General Washington, disliked the British. They 
donated jewels and about 1.2 million pounds sterling, suffi  cient to pay all the 
salaries of a 5,000-man detachment for four months.2 Historian Stephen 
Bonsal wrote later (1945) that “The million that was supplied by the ladies 
of Havana, may, with truth, be regarded as the ‘bottom dollars’ upon which 
the edifi ce of American independence was erected.”3
John Adams, the second president of the US, in 1783 had designated 
Cuba as a natural point of expansion for the US, and urged that the US pre-
vent the independence of Cuba until it could be pried loose from Spain, a 
policy followed until the US eventually defeated Spain in war more than a 
century later. Thomas Jeff erson, who saw that control of Cuba could trans-
form the US into the “masters of the Caribbean,” observed that Cuba’s “inde-
pendence against all the world except Spain would be nearly as valuable to us 
as if it were our own.”4 In November 1805, President Jeff erson told the Brit-
ish minister in Washington, according to the latter, that “In the event of hos-
tilities he considered that East and West Florida and successively the Island 
of Cuba, the possession of which was necessary to the defense of Louisiana 
and Florida . . . would be an easy  conquest . . . ”5 By 1823, he would counsel 
James Monroe to “oppose, with all our means,” Cuba’s “transfer to any power, 
by conquest, cession or in any other way.”6
US leaders also knew that the revolution in Haiti7 had driven many of the 
surviving French – allies of the US – to Cuba. Cuba’s fertile lands were rich 
in precious woods, and, with slave labor, produced great wealth in sugar and 
rum. With its fi ne harbors, beautiful beaches, and strategic location, the 
island was ripe for the picking. In 1823, Secretary of State John Quincy 
Adams instructed the US minister in Spain on the laws of political as well as 
physical gravity in this manner: “ . . . if an apple, severed by the tempest from 
its native tree, cannot but fall to the ground, Cuba, forcibly disjoined from 
its unnatural connection with Spain and incapable of self-support, can gravi-
tate only to the North American union, which by the same law of nature, 
cannot cast her off  from its bosom.” He added: “Cuba . . . has become an 
object of transcendent importance to the political and commercial interests 
2) Lasaga 1984, Vol. I, p. 114.
3) Bonsal 1945, p. 120.
4) Thomas Jeff erson to James Monroe, June 11, 1823. See Pérez, Jr. 1997, pp. 40–41.
5) Portell Vilá, Vol. I, p. 142. Cf. Williams, p. 410.
6) Thomas Jeff erson to James Monroe, October 24, 1823. See Pérez, Jr. 1997, p. 41.
7) The Haitian Revolution lasted from 1791 to 1803.
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of our Union . . . The annexation of Cuba to our federal republic will be 
indispensable to the continuance and integrity of the Union itself.”8
Jeff erson concurred. In his letter to President Monroe of 24 October 1823 
he wrote: “I candidly confess that I have ever looked on Cuba as the most 
interesting addition which could ever be made to our system of states. The 
controul which with Florida point, this island would give us over the Gulph 
of Mexico and the countries, and the Isthmus bordering on it, as well as 
all those whose waters fl ow into it, would fi ll up the measure of our politi cal 
well-being.”9 In the same year, President Monroe issued his warning to Europe 
to stay out of  America – which, he considered, would thereaft er belong to 
the “sphere of infl uence” of the US.
The very fi rst territory to the south of the US was Mexico, which would 
be attacked 23 years later. The next territory to the south of the US 
was Cuba.
An Empire Ends, Another Begins
Spain still had the power and wealth to defend its remaining colonies in the 
Caribbean, but Cubans had their minds set on joining the rest of liberated 
America. In 1868, shortly aft er the end of the Civil War in the US, Cuban 
independence was proclaimed and armed struggle began. The Ten Years’ 
War dragged on without resolution, and following negotiations an unquiet 
peace lasted for 17 years. In 1895, war broke out again: the War of Indepen-
dence. The commander in chief of the Cuban army was Máximo Gómez, 
who spent more than half his life fi ghting for Cuban independence. A 
Dominican who had abandoned the Spanish army and moved to Cuba, he 
was, like Hatuey, from Hispaniola.
Spain sent 100,000 soldiers to take on the newly-rebellious Cubans. The 
empire was spent, however. Year by year, the Cubans gained ground. The US 
was watching. Whereas during the Ten Years’ War the US had been focused 
on reconstruction and on reuniting a bitterly divided nation, it was now in a 
position to make real the earlier dreams of its own Caribbean empire. For 
8) John Quincy Adams to Hugh Nelson, April 28, 1823. See Portell Vilá, Vol. I, p. 226.
9) See Pérez, Jr. 1997, p. 39. The text of the letter is available online via the Jeff erson 
Papers, Library of Congress: http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/mtj:@fi eld
(DOCID+@lit(jm040139)).
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decades, it had waited for Spain to lose its grip more than for Cuba to break 
free. It was time to prevent independence through direct action.
The ideological leader of the war was José Martí, one of America’s greatest 
intellectuals and men of action. He had lived in the US, organizing cigar 
 workers in Tampa and writing for the New York Sun and other publications. 
At fi rst an admirer of the energy and industriousness he found in the US, he 
later  concluded that the country posed the principal threat to Cuba and the 
nations beyond. In a letter to a Mexican friend shortly before he was killed in 
battle he wrote:
Every day I am in danger of giving my life for my country and for my duty – for I under-
stand that duty, and am disposed to carry it out – to prevent the United States, with the 
independence of Cuba, from expanding throughout the Antilles and falling with that 
 additional strength on our lands of America. All I have done so far, and will do, is for 
that purpose.10
This is the letter in which he wrote of the “brutal and turbulent North which 
despises [us],” and that “I have lived in the monster and I know its entrails; 
my sling is David’s.”
Martí was killed in battle, as was the great general Antonio Maceo, 
for whom were named many African–Americans in honor of the black gen-
eral who ran circles around the Spanish army. Notwithstanding the painful 
losses – and the decimation of the Cuban population (at least 300,000, nearly 
20% of Cuba’s 1.6 million people, died between 1895 and 1897), the col-
lapse of the Cuban economy, the horrendous consequences of the policy of 
reconcentración (forced urbanization of the rural population) introduced by 
Spanish general Valeriano Weyler, hunger and unemployment, the spread of 
disease – the war proceeded.11 Victory and nationhood were within grasp 
when the 24-gun battleship Maine (making a “courtesy call”) exploded in 
Havana harbor, leading to a declaration of war by the US against Spain. 
Within hours, President McKinley made clear that the US would not recog-
nize the Cuban declaration of independence. In short order, Teddy  Roosevelt 
led his Rough Riders up San Juan Hill – with critical although seldom-
 mentioned assistance from mambises12 under general Calixto García – and 
Spain surrendered to the US. The terms of the surrender in Santiago de Cuba 
10) Gran Enciclopedia Martiana, Vol. 5, p. 322.
11) Foner 1972, Vol. I, pp. 98–118. Cf. Pérez, Jr. 1998.
12) “Mambí” was the Cuban term for a combatant for independence.
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barred the Cubans from entering the city at all, and defi ned Santiago as ter-
ritory conquered by the US and as such “part of the Union.” The “splendid 
little war” (as John Hay proclaimed it aft er the fall of Santiago) lasted sixty 
days, but it transmogrifi ed a long-fought liberation struggle into a US war 
of conquest.
What had been the Cuban War of Independence became, in the US, the 
“Spanish–American War.” The peace treaty was signed in Paris, without 
Cubans at the table. Spain ceded to the US its colonies – Cuba, Puerto Rico, 
the Philippines, and Guam. The Spanish empire in America was gone, and 
the US, ascendant, began its imperialist era. The Cubans went from one 
colonial master to another. On 8 January 1899 General Máximo Gómez 
wrote in his diary:
The attitude of the American Government towards the heroic Cuban people in these 
historic moments reveals, to my judgment, no more than a grand business, aside from the 
dangers for the Country presented by a situation that mortifi es the public spirit and hin-
ders organization in all of its branches . . . when all was completely its own work, of all the 
inhabitants of the island without distinction of nationality . . . there cannot be in Cuba 
the true moral peace that the peoples need for their happiness and good fortune; for the 
duration of the transitional government, imposed by the spreading force of a foreign, and 
therefore illegitimate, Power incompatible with the principles that the entire Country 
has sustained for so long and in defense of which half its sons were sacrifi ced and its 
wealth consumed.13
An Independence of Sorts
Direct US control of Cuba lasted from 1898 to 1902. The Cuban yearning 
for independence still burned brightly. The US settled for granting limited 
sovereignty: it would keep Puerto Rico as a colony, and also reserve its rights 
to the Isle of Youth (formerly the Isle of Pines, Stevenson’s legendary Trea-
sure Island, off  the southern coast of Cuba’s main island). The US would also 
keep as a coaling station for steamships the deep-water port at Guantánamo, 
which provided a window on Jamaica, Haiti, and the islands to the east, as 
well as a second harbor, Bahía Honda. The US would soon sign a treaty with 
the new state of Panama, in 1903,14 with the purpose of taking over the work 
13) Cordero Michel 2005, p. 230.
14) Actually, the treaty was signed with the French director of the canal company, Philippe 
Bunau-Varilla.
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on the canal. Roosevelt, who had become president in 1901, described 
 Guantánamo as the “absolute necessary strategic base” for controlling the 
Caribbean and the routes to the Panama Canal.
By then, it was clear that Patrick Henry’s stirring words about liberty did 
not necessarily apply to other nations, just as they had not applied to the 
Africans or Native Americans in the Thirteen Colonies. President Roosevelt 
had plans for Cuba, and they did not involve liberty from the US. The army 
of occupation invested in sanitation and public hygiene, principally to com-
bat the same infectious diseases that had dramatically slowed the work of the 
Panama Canal under the French, but disallowed any nation-building on the 
part of the Cubans. Indeed, the US chose to reappoint to public offi  ce many 
of the Spaniards who had served the former colonial master.
Some in Congress disdained the new imperial course of the US; some 
simply held economic interests that would be inconvenienced by denying 
independence. The deal fi nally agreed to was advanced by Connecticut Sen-
ator Orville Platt, based on principles previously laid out by Secretary of War 
Elihu Root: Cuba would be permitted a formal independence upon certain 
 conditions being met. Platt amended a pending authorizations bill to stipu-
late the conditions of Cuban independence, and the constitution of the new 
republic was re-written to ensure that Cuba would maintain a low public 
debt; refrain from signing any treaty impairing its obligation to the United 
States; grant to the United States the right of intervention to protect life, 
liberty, and property; validate the acts of the outgoing military government; 
and, if requested, provide long-term naval leases. A Permanent Treaty of 
1903 set forth the details of the military bases to be used by the US.15
Finally, the Cuban nation had been born, but hardly free and hardly 
 independent. Platt would later write: “Cubans are incapable of stable self-
government. In many respects, they are like children.”16 Governor General 
Leonard Wood dismissed the Cubans who advocated independence as 
 “ignorant masses,” the “unruly rabble,” “trouble makers,” “the element . . . 
absolutely without any conception of its responsibilities or duties as citizens.” 
He added: “When the Spanish–American war was declared the United 
States took a step forward, and assumed a position as protector of the inter-
ests of Cuba. It became responsible for the welfare of the people, politically, 
mentally and morally.”17
15) Foner 1972, p. 559.
16) Foner  1972, p. 584. Cf. Schoultz 1998.
17) Pérez, Jr. 1997, pp. 100–106.
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In 1902, when the Republic of Cuba was formally established, Senator 
 Stephen Elkins clearly spelled out the strategic implications for US national 
interests: 
When Cuba shall become part of the American Union and the isthmian canal shall be 
completed, which is now assured, Porto Rico, Cuba, Hawaii and the Philippines will be 
outposts of the great Republic, standing guard over American interests in the track of the 
world’s commerce in its triumphant march across the globe. Our people will soon see and 
feel that these island possessions belonging to the United States are natural and logical, 
and in the great part we are to play in the aff airs of the world we would not only not give 
them up but wonder how in the working of our national destiny we could get on without 
them. This splendid chain of island possessions, reaching half-way around the world, 
would not be complete without Cuba, the gem of the Antilles.18
Renewed Intervention
The US re-established direct control of Cuba between 1906 and 1909 as a 
result of internal political strife on the island. In 1912, black Cubans grouped 
in the Independent Party of Color, who now found their future compro-
mised aft er fi ghting for equality, rebelled. The US intervened once again to 
help put down the revolt.19 Not coincidentally, that year, President William 
H. Taft  expressed in these words his vision of what was to come: “The day is 
not far distant when three Stars and Stripes at three equidistant points will 
mark our territory; one at the North Pole, another at the Panama Canal, and 
the third at the South Pole. The whole hemisphere will be ours in fact as, by 
virtue of our superiority of race, it already is ours morally.”20
The Marines were deployed to Cuba once again from 1917 to 1923, a 
period when US offi  cials and businesspeople basically ran the country. From 
1925 to 1933, Gerardo Machado, the “jackass with claws,”21 a friend and 
admirer of the US, instituted a violent and corrupt dictatorship. The US 
supported him until he was no longer an asset. He was overthrown (and fl ed 
to the US), and a period of uncertainty followed, leading to a mass display of 
US gunboats off shore. The Platt Amendment was fi nally abrogated in 1934. 
18) Cited from the Congressional Record of the 57th Congress in Pérez, Jr. 1998, p. 49.
19) Fermoselle 1974.
20) Galeano 2000, p. 172.
21) The phrase came from Julio Antonio Mella, student and anti-imperialist leader and 
co-founder of the fi rst Cuban Communist party. He was assassinated in Mexico while walking 
with Italian photographer Tina Modotti.
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The US, however, kept the base at Guantánamo Bay, until such time as both 
parties agreed to cancel the agreement – in practice, for as long as the US 
chose to keep it. The Cubans coined a new adjective: platista, meaning 
“interventionist like the Platt amendment.” Soon, a second dictatorship 
would follow, that of Fulgencio Batista, who would dominate Cuban politics 
in one way or another until 1959, enjoying the support of the US until the 
end was inevitable.
US capital fl owed into Cuba; by 1929 US direct investment in Cuba 
totaled nearly one billion dollars – more than one-fourth of all US invest-
ment in Latin America, and more than that invested by US capital in any 
Latin American country on a per-capita basis and in absolute terms.22 US 
interests owned the major sugar properties, the railroads, the telephone and 
electricity companies, signifi cant factories, and major hotels and casinos, an 
area that came to be dominated by a US mafi a led by Meyer Lansky. Con-
trary to what Martí had fought for, economic and political interests were 
oriented toward and controlled by the US. The Cuban president was said to 
be the second most powerful man on the island, aft er the US ambassador. 
The misbehavior of US sailors on shore leave, the control exercised by US 
interests, the brutality of a dictator supported by the US, all combined to 
fuel anti-US sentiments.
In 1956, Fidel Castro landed on the shores of Oriente, at the time the 
eastern most province, and with 11 other survivors of the ambushed landing 
launched a guerrilla war in parallel to the existing underground resistance 
and to the political opposition in the cities.23 Three years later, in the early 
hours of 1 January 1959, Batista left  the country aft er looting the national 
treasury. The post-colonial period of US–Cuba relations was over, ending 
what in Cuba is now called “the pseudo-republic.” The stage was set for a 
head-on confrontation.
Marx Joins Martí
In the 56 years of Cuba’s limited sovereignty the world had changed pro-
foundly. Diesel-powered dreadnoughts had overtaken steamships powered 
22) Cf. Pérez, Jr. 1997, pp. 117–148.
23) The expeditionary force consisted of 82 guerrillas who left  from Mexico aboard a danger-
ously overloaded yacht, named Granma, in English. Granma is now also the name of the 
 offi  cial newspaper of the Cuban Communist Party and of the province where the landing 
took place.
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by coal. The airplane had gone from cloth-covered test models to soaring jet 
planes and high-altitude bombers and spy planes. Submarines prowled the 
seas. Two World Wars had led to the development and use of the atomic 
bomb. The Soviet Union had come into being and become the fi rst nation to 
go into space. China, in a massive upheaval, had joined the socialist camp. 
The space race, the arms race, and the Cold War were on.
The revolution that overthrew Batista found its inspiration in the strug-
gles of the preceding century and in the writings of José Martí and others 
who had built a Cuban identity and sense of nationhood. Of course, Cubans 
in 1959 were aware of the opinions historically held of them by successive US 
 presidents, legislators, and military commanders. The Revolution was pro-
foundly anti-imperialist. Fidel Castro’s own views were shaped also by his 
childhood among the farm workers of far-eastern Oriente, and by the experi-
ence of the rebels in the Sierra Maestra, who found support from the peas-
ants in the mountains and saw fi rst-hand the poverty of what was then a 
remote and ignored area.
There was also the class-based ideology that had taken root in Cuba aft er 
the Bolsheviks’ successful rise to power in Russia.24 As the Revolution deep-
ened and class confl icts sharpened, as the state became the only entity capable 
of substituting for large US corporations, and as Cuba sought support in its 
face-off  with the US – support that it received from the Soviet Union – 
Marxist socialism became central to revolutionary ideology. In line with the 
changes that had transformed the world between 1902 and 1958, rural and 
underdeveloped Cuba now adopted an ideology born of the Industrial Rev-
olution in the means of production and the accumulation of international 
capital. The Soviet Union and the socialist block would disappear in time, 
but for thirty years they made possible the survival of the Revolution.
Alone and Blockaded
In 1991 the Soviet Union imploded. Shock therapy was in the cards for the 
post-Soviet states, including Russia itself, where the cold-turkey shift  to 
unregulated capitalism brought declining health indices and declining 
 production, mafi as, and the outfl ow of rubles to foreign banks. Russia, under 
Yeltsin, was making friends with its former enemy. Cuba was on its own.
24) The Cuban communist party, eventually named Popular Socialist Party (PSP), was 
founded in 1921.
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The drastic shift  had a profound eff ect upon Cuba. Practically overnight, 
imports fell by 75%. There was no capital to invest; or oil, which until then 
had been supplied in suffi  cient quantities and on favorable terms by the 
Soviet Union. Without oil, machinery ground to a halt, as did the means of 
transporting people and materials. Horse-drawn carriages traveled the roads. 
Farm workers plowed and pulled with oxen. Sugar cane was no longer cut by 
the huge combines of Soviet-Cuban design, which could make short work of 
harvesting an entire fi eld; again, the cane was cut by hand. The government 
had prepared for what it called the Special Period in Time of Peace, and cre-
ated Option Zero, the strategy for addressing zero-oil conditions if those 
came to pass, but no amount of planning could make up for the lack of 
resources. The economy went into free fall. Life became exceedingly hard.
In the US, Cuba was seen as the next in the series of falling dominoes. If 
Russia, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, with their high levels 
of development, willingly abandoned socialism to join the consumer society, 
could Cuba be far behind? Still, to help the process along, Congress in 1992 
passed into law at the behest of then-Congressman Robert Torricelli the 
“Cuban Democracy Act,”25 a hardening of the embargo that purported to 
control the behavior of other nations with respect to Cuba, and which 
brought such diplomatic complications that George Bush the elder, in his 
re-election campaign, opposed it, while challenger Bill Clinton moved to the 
right to support it. The embargo turned into a blockade.
Yet, Cuba did not fall. It reorganized its economy towards Europe and 
Latin America and Asia and invited foreign investments – especially in tour-
ism – while maintaining basic educational and social programs. In the mid 
1990s its economy started to surpass the growth rate of the neo-liberal econ-
omies of Latin America. The Revolution was going to survive. Consequently, 
a further tightening was carefully devised, this time sponsored by Senator 
Jesse Helms and Congressman Dan Burton. The “Cuban Liberty and Dem-
ocratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act,”26 passed and signed into law in 1996, 
imposed among other things conditions for recognition of a post-
 revolutionary government. Such a government would be required to begin to 
turn over nationalized properties to their former owners – in eff ect, a program to 
restore property relations as they were during the Batista dictatorship.
25) The text of the law is available at http://uscode.house.gov/download/pls/22C69.txt.
26) Th e text of the law is available at http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/laws/majorlaw/
h927_enr.htm.
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“Castro has to leave, vertically or horizontally,’’ said Marc Thiessen, press 
spokesman for Senator Jesse Helms. Miami and Washington reviewed plans 
to arrange for an exile for the Castro brothers and other details of a change 
seen, once again, as inevitable. But despite the hardships, dissension at home, 
and a growing number of illegal exits from the country, Cuba held on. Unable 
to provide for the needs of Cuba’s own population, the government dropped 
its activities in support of revolutionary and nationalist forces overseas. The 
Washington Consensus became the blueprint for development In Latin 
America.
Realignment in the New Century
The 21st century brought a new alignment of forces in South America. 
Three decades of the neo-liberal model, imposed at fi rst by military dictator-
ships, had failed to deliver economic prosperity. Instead, poverty grew, and 
wealth became more and more concentrated in fewer hands. The privatized 
economies left  nations without assets. In reaction, open elections brought 
center-left  and left  governments to Venezuela, Brazil, and Argentina, and 
later in Uruguay and Bolivia. People throughout Latin America called for a 
closer relationship with Cuba, and then with Venezuela. By 2004, Cuba 
could count on sizable investments from China and Venezuela, even from 
NAFTA member Canada, and maintained friendly relations with most 
American countries. Cuba revalued its currency and began a series of social 
investments that it had been unable to make since the fall of the Soviet 
Union. The Special Period was reaching its end. Cuba still placed at the top 
of health and education rankings worldwide, and similarly in the areas of 
culture and the arts, sports, and other aspects of social development. It even 
looked ahead to increasing its oil-producing potential, with the possibility of 
becoming a net exporter.
Once again, the US responded, this time through the George W. Bush 
administration.27 Eff ective November 2004, it limited family contacts (rede-
fi ning the meaning of “family” itself to exclude aunts and uncles, cousins, 
nephews and nieces), restricted contacts with immediate family members to 
one short trip every three years, and reduced the amount of money that could 
27) From Eisenhower to the younger Bush, every president of the U.S. has attempted to over-
throw the Revolution.
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be sent to their relatives in Cuba. It set aside additional money to foment 
dissidence within Cuba. It also created new obstacles to US agricultural trade 
with Cuba, which – as a rare exception to the blockade – was growing geo-
metrically. In the same year, the Bush administration named a Commission 
for Assistance to a Free Cuba. The Commission produced a Transition Plan 
that set out the process of transforming a future Cuban state into a model 
dependent neo-liberal economy.28
The US broadened the traditional political attacks on Cuba to include 
Venezuela and other independent-minded states whose national resources, 
markets, and labor forces remained to be controlled through free-trade trea-
ties. A second report of the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba, offi  -
cially released in July 2006, cited Cuba as a key support for Venezuela, which 
itself was mentioned 16 times in that report on Cuba.29 For its part, Cuba, 
emboldened by its economic recovery, kept up its denunciations of the US 
and its economic and political system.
There is little likelihood at present of a decrease in tensions between the 
US and Cuba, because what is in play now is the economic alignment of the 
Southern Hemisphere: will it become a grouping of neo-liberal economies 
bound by treaties to a dominant US economy, or will it evolve in the direc-
tion of a nationalist/center-left /socialist block of nations building relations 
among themselves instead of looking to the US for direction? The positions 
taken by John Kerry in the 2004 elections showed that Democrats will not 
diff er much from Republicans as concerns Cuba, or Latin America, for that 
matter. At the time of this writing, the Bush administration was only halfway 
through its second term, and remained fi rmly allied with the most conserva-
tive Cuban-American sectors. In July 2006, Cuba signed a trade compact 
with MERCOSUR (Mercado común del sur), the trading block that includes 
Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, Uruguay, and Paraguay as principal partners, 
facilitating imports from those countries as a further avenue to bypass the 
blockade.30
28) The 2004 Report is available at http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rt/cuba/.
29) The 2006 Report is available at http://www.cafc.gov/rpt/2006/.
30) On 28 July 2006, the Washington Post published an op-ed opinion by Alvaro Vargas-
Llosa entitled, with apparently humorous intent, “Has Mercosur Gone Bananas?”
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Attraction and Expulsion
Spanish colonialism in Cuba extended from 1492 to 1898, or 406 years. US 
colonialism in the island lasted for four years more, to 1902. The post-
 colonial republic lasted 56 years (May 1902 to December 1958). By January 
2007, the Revolution will have lasted 48 years. For the entire period aft er 
independence from Spain, the US and Cuba have been bound tightly 
together by forces of attraction and repulsion, whether in a planet-satellite 
relationship or as enemies destined by geography to remain a few dozen miles 
from each other.31
Like people from other Caribbean islands close to the vast and promising 
nation on the continent, Cubans have long been drawn to the US. Father 
Félix Varela (1788–1853), revered on both sides of the Straits and for whom 
the dissident Varela Project of 2001 was named, escaped a Spanish death 
 sentence in the early 19th century to spend the rest of his life in the US. 
When José Martí (who was born in the same year of Varela’s death) began to 
build support for independence he found an established community of 
Cuban immigrant cigar workers in Florida, and others in New York. Tomás 
Estrada Palma was a citizen of the US for 15 years before he returned home 
to become the fi rst Cuban president in 1902. Beginning early in the 20th 
century,  whenever political personalities and parties in Cuba ran into trou-
ble, they called upon the US for help. Mostly, the US was glad to oblige: 
there were even provisions in the Cuban constitution that allowed it to inter-
vene. And intervene it did, right up to the end of Batista’s rule.
Before 1959, Cuba, like other countries, exported working-class labor and 
brain-drain graduates to the US, emigrants who in the main decided to stay. 
With the Revolution, Cuba exported a practically-entire bourgeoisie, which 
defi ned itself as an exile rather than an emigration. In the main, they did 
want to return, not as simple citizens, but to take back the government.
It was inevitable that the dominant class evicted from power would seek 
shelter across the Florida straits, and that from there they would plan the 
restoration by any means necessary. The US government welcomed the 
 batistianos and the exiles who came by the tens of thousands, extending to 
them the resources to make their plans possible: employment and business 
opportunities, government contracts, a favorable press, and help from the 
31) Cf. Pérez, Jr. 1997; Smith 1987.
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CIA and the FBI, aside from education and relocation programs, a special 
Cuban Welfare Program, and the Cuban Adjustment Act.32
Aft er the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion and Operation Mongoose,33 as 
it became clear that the struggle would be for the long term, US advisors 
counseled the exiles to take on a new role, creating the Cuban American 
National Foundation. Miami harbored still a variety of paramilitary groups, 
oft en composed of men previously trained by the CIA and the armed forces, 
but the new model was to become dominant. The leadership of the exile 
opposition changed its image from commando operations to lobbying Con-
gress and the White House, from fatigues and gunboats to suits and ties and 
fund-raising events.
The second generation of the batistianos and the “historical exiles” of the 
early 1960s grew up to become infl uential economic and political fi gures. 
They developed in symbiosis with the US government, as each side had 
something to off er the other in support of the common goals of combating 
communism and once more controlling the Pearl of the Antilles. Their grow-
ing infl uence over Miami radio and newspapers, and a hard-edged style of 
eliminating the opposition, contributed to their establishing a hegemonic 
presence in Miami that continues to the present, with considerable infl uence 
in the US government, wholly disproportionate to their numbers.
For Cuba, the US is still a tantalizingly accessible source of grains, beans, 
and other dry foodstuff s, cattle, milk, apples, canned goods, and – poten-
tially – medical and hi-tech equipment, motor vehicles and construction 
machinery, airplanes, and in general everything that an advanced society of 
temperate zones can off er, even investment capital. It also sees in the US its 
principal foreign threat, an imperialist power that for over a century has tried 
to subordinate Cuba for its own benefi t.
For the US, Cuba is a nation at once exotic and familiar, a warm and fertile 
land that could become a jewel of the tourist business, a source of cultural 
commodities and world-class baseball players, and a springboard to the 
Caribbean and Latin America, as well as a dependable market supported by 
a healthy and educated population. Instead, it fi nds in Cuba a tenacious 
opponent that, far beyond defending its perimeter, openly challenges US 
32) The Act grants residency to any Cuban who enters the United States with or without 
documentation, albeit complicated by the current dry-foot, wet-foot policy of applicability.
33) On Operation Mongoose, see http://www.marxists.org/history/cuba/subject/cia/
mongoose/c-project.htm.
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hegemony in Latin America and denounces its activities on the continent 
and the world; a former ally of the greatest opponent the US has faced, the 
land where nuclear missiles were stationed closest to – and targeted on – the 
US mainland, and the only country in Latin America to survive not only 
a US-sponsored invasion but 46 years of economic warfare and covert 
 operations.34
Neither country gains from the blockade. Each would like for it to be over, 
but on its own terms. Cuba wants the blockade to disappear, but in order to 
continue to build its program of anti-imperialist socialism oriented to the 
developing world. The US would like to establish close ties with Cuba – but 
only if it becomes a neo-conservative, privatized, capitalist economy, with 
elections that yield political leaders aligned with the US. The Cuban govern-
ment cannot conceive of a sovereign, independent state, with social justice, 
in today’s world without a socialist government to guarantee it. The US – 
now as a matter of law and of explicit policy set forth in the Transition 
Plan – will not undertake normal relations with Cuba until the socialist 
state is dismantled and Cuba is once again a US dependency.
Civil and Human Rights
Of all of the arguments raised against Cuba’s government, none has had such 
impact, especially in the US and Europe, as those that challenge the lack of 
civil rights in Cuba in terms of freedom of speech and press, multiparty elec-
tions, and due process: freedoms from the state of the individual’s private 
choice and initiative. Oft en, these are phrased as individual human rights, a 
concept that for the US does not include such Cuban (and, oft en, interna-
tional) postulates as the right to a job, the right to education, and the right to 
medical care irrespective of income: rights inherent to a shared humanity 
that the state must protect and foster.35
34) The embargo began under Dwight Eisenhower on 15 October 1960. Eisenhower also left  
for John F. Kennedy the planned invasion of Bay of Pigs.
35) As Blau and Moncada (2005, p. 15) point out: “Today we consider human rights – not 
simply rights – to mean inter-connected freedoms and opportunities. To illustrate, there are 
now international agreements about the following fundamental rights: food security; hous-
ing; education; health care; social security; employment; leisure; freedom of expression; free-
dom of movement; privacy; political freedoms; civil rights; freedom from discrimination; 
freedom to join a trade union; freedom to marry; protections for children; protections for the 
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People in the US, used to everyday choice in everything from taking part 
in protest marches or joining a political party to traveling outside the coun-
try (anywhere but to Cuba), understand these arguments by direct compari-
son to their own lives, especially when they grow up learning abut the Bill of 
Rights in the US Constitution. They are among the most powerful argu-
ments wielded by the US government in support of regime change in Cuba. 
It is true that most people who are asked in US polls also say that they favor 
an end to the blockade and would like the option to visit Cuba, while power-
ful business sectors press for an opening of trade between the two countries. 
Still, the issue of rights remains: no society in today’s world should be exempt 
from guaranteeing basic human and civil rights to its people.36 That subject, 
however, does not determine US–Cuba relations, even if it is essential to the 
offi  cial US discourse on Cuba.
Civil and human rights are not the basis for US policy concerning Cuba, 
and never have been. From the time of Jeff erson and Adams to the July 2006 
commission report, the real interests have been the same: strategic location, 
land, resources, markets, and inexpensive labor, albeit with such variations as 
access to good beaches, casinos, and prostitution. As in any actual or prospec-
tive colonial relation, the civil and human rights of the actually or prospec-
tively colonized do not matter. Such concerns did not keep the US from 
precluding Cuban sovereignty in 1898, nor were they raised during the dic-
tatorships of Machado and Batista. Since 1954, when the US destroyed 
democracy and civil and human rights in Guatemala, Cubans have seen the 
US – in Latin America alone – support the Somoza and Duvalier dynasties 
and ensure that the elected president in the Dominican Republic did not 
remain in offi  ce; they have seen the violent overthrow of democracy in Chile, 
a not-so-secret war to bring down the elected government in Nicaragua, the 
support or even creation of death squads in El Salvador, and the cordial and 
elderly and disabled; rights to a cultural, racial, or ethnic identity; protections for minority 
and indigenous populations; language rights; and environmental rights.” See also Blau and 
Moncada 2006.
36) “Perhaps the most succinct summary of the overall objectives of these multilateral instru-
ments is the statement adopted at the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights: ‘All human 
rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. The international com-
munity must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and 
with the same emphasis. While the signifi cance of national and regional particularities and 
various historical, cultural, and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of 
States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all 
human rights and fundamental freedoms.’” Blau and Moncada 2005, p. 32.
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discrete relations kept by the US with dictatorial and unimaginably repres-
sive regimes in Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Bolivia.37
Moreover, Cubans today see tens of thousands of civilians killed in Iraq 
as a result of a war launched by the US with the pretense of building 
democracy, and hear US offi  cials defend torture as standard operating 
procedure –  torture that has been practiced in Cuba, but at the US base 
in Guantánamo – while doing business with such governments as that of 
Saudi Arabia, where the ruling family of the hereditary and theocratic mon-
archy are friends and partners of the family of the current US president. Since 
1959, Cubans have lived with the  certain expectation of new attempts by the 
US to re-colonize Cuba in informal annexation, knowing that, for the US, it 
can become necessary to destroy the village in order to save it.
From the US point of view, capital cannot move freely – nor, accordingly, 
can there be freedom – when individuals, groups, businesses, or political par-
ties in Cuba are unable to make alliances with their more powerful  neighbors 
independently of the government. From the Cuban point of view, national 
 sover eignty cannot survive so close to those same neighbors without a cen-
tralized and restrictive social structure: for the Cuban government, the sur-
vival of the Revolution is a necessary precondition to reforming the 
 Revolution.
The arguments over the character and observance of civil and human 
rights in Cuba continue. The issue of what kind of society the Cubans can 
and should build is properly of concern to all people – especially within 
Cuba – who stand for civil and human rights. That is not, however, central 
to understanding US–Cuba relations for the past two centuries, which are 
the focus of this essay and which, at this writing, remain at an impasse.
The Continuing Debate
As an expanding world power – from its defeat of British colonialism in 
America, to its imperial pursuits at the start of the 20th century, to its sur-
vival of two World Wars without the massive destruction suff ered by the 
European nations and Japan, to its emergence from the Cold War as the sole 
superpower – the US has kept alive the original dream of John Adams of 
harvesting the ripe golden fruit of the Caribbean, and the later dream of 
 William H. Taft  to lead an American empire extending from Pole to Pole.
37) See Menjívar and Rodríguez 2005.
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Successive US governments have not been unanimous in their approach 
to Cuba. At the least, there have been tactical diff erences within an overall 
strategic goal. Some sectors argue, for example, that enveloping Cuba in the 
embrace of consumerism and open trade would make the island – and would 
have done so long ago – a very acceptable partner of the US, with perhaps 
some traces of a prickly nationalism and a penchant for public health, but 
otherwise well behaved. 
With the Cold War over, can the United States change course in its 
approach to Cuba? The outcome of the Middle East wars and of the new 
relationships arising between countries and economies in Latin America may 
decide the answer. So may developments in Asia involving China and India 
and Viet Nam, a renewed attempt to overthrow the government of Vene-
zuela, a collapse of the dollar, peak oil, or other events not yet on the horizon. 
But history holds little hope for a real change in the near future, and the 
 current neo-conservative plans for the projection of US power worldwide 
make such a change even less likely.38
Can Cuba accept the United States as just a large neighbor to the north, 
like Canada, and learn to quietly cohabit with it in a community of Ameri-
can nations? As long as the economic and political relationship of the US 
with the rest of Latin America and the Caribbean and the developing world 
does not change, that is not likely. Those who place their hopes on the death 
of Fidel Castro may be disappointed, for all of the history described above 
will not go away because of the absence of one man.
When Congress considered its resolution authorizing war against Spain 
in 1898, it adopted the amendment of Senator Henry M. Teller specifying 
that: “ . . . the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to 
exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said Island except for the 
pacifi cation thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, 
to leave the government and control of the Island to its people.” As war drew 
near, however, politicians, businessmen, and editorialists began to interpret 
the Teller Amendment to mean something other than what it said. The New 
York Journal of Commerce put it thus: “The Teller amendment . . . must be 
interpreted in a sense somewhat diff erent from that which its author intended 
it to bear.”39 This, too, joined the list of events defi ning – at least for the 
Cubans – the history between the two countries.
38) Cf. http://www.newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf.
39) Zinn 2001, pp. 304–305.
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That history is connected to the present. Thus, while there is scarcely a 
trace in US collective memory of the US exclusion from Santiago de Cuba of 
the Cuban Liberation Army in the summer of 1898, sixty years later it would 
be remembered by Fidel Castro in a radio broadcast to the nation on 2 Janu-
ary 1959, the day aft er Batista fl ed the country and the victorious rebel army 
entered the city: “This time the revolution will not be thwarted . . . It will not 
be like the war of 1895, when the Americans arrived and made themselves 
masters of the country; they intervened at the last minute and later did not 
even allow Calixto García, who had been fi ghting for thirty years, to enter 
Santiago de Cuba.”40 Nearly half a century later, the Commission for Assis-
tance to a Free Cuba and its transition plans of 2004 and 2006, representing 
the latest eff ort of the US to condition the recognition of the Cuban repub-
lic, can be summed up in one word: platista.
Fidel Castro’s sign-off  slogan at the end of every speech is Patria o Muerte: 
Fatherland or Death. It evokes the Hymn of the Republic, dating to the Ten 
Years’ War: Morir por la Patria es vivir: To die for the Fatherland is to live. 
Patrick Henry and the revolutionaries of the Thirteen Colonies would 
understand it instinctively.
The US maintains in its offi  cial declarations that it wishes only to have 
Cuba join the US in the pleasures and benefi ts of industrialized democracy 
and the consumer society. Cubans with a sense of history from Hatuey to the 
Teller and Platt Amendments to the 2006 update of the transition plan may 
reply: “If that is heaven, we would rather go to hell.”
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